

PROGRAM FOR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

The West Must Explain Itself to Soviet Youth

HUGH SETON-WATSON

FOUR months after the October days in Poland and the Hungarian revolution, the political outlook remains confused in Eastern Europe, and indeed for Europe as a whole.

In Poland the Gomulka regime does not seem to be in immediate danger. The January 20 election to the Sejm was to have allowed a certain freedom of choice to the voters, as in each constituency the number of candidates was larger than the number of seats. But at the last moment Gomulka appealed to the voters to renounce this freedom and to choose only the first names on each list, the official candidates of the Communist-led National Front. The appeal was successful, and the election was a plebiscite for Gomulka. It seems probable that this reversal of attitude by the government was caused by fear that if many non-official candidates were elected, the Soviet government might choose to regard this as proof of "counter-revolution," and treat Poland as it had treated Hungary. But in any case the new Sejm, though composed of persons approved by the government, is certainly something quite different from its predecessor and includes persons of very varied views. It is quite likely that the People's (peasant) and Democratic parties, hitherto helpless

satellites of the Communists, will be able to exert some real influence. A number of independent Catholic intellectuals have been elected on the government list. Above all, the United Workers (Communist) party itself is changing into something new. If he is to resist the overt and covert Stalinists within the party, Gomulka cannot do without the support of the former Social Democrats. Nor can he ignore the pressure from the workers, who are now demanding genuine industrial self-government. Gomulka's declared policies amount to a reversal of the dogmatic priority for heavy industry, the forced collectivization of agriculture, and exploitation of the peasants that marked the Bierut era.

If Poland can surmount her economic difficulties, and if the Soviet government does not intervene, there is real hope of evolution towards something which could be described without hypocrisy as democratic socialism. The prospects are more hopeful than they ever were in Yugoslavia after 1949. One reason is that Poland is a more industrial country than Yugoslavia, and the Poles a more educated and skilled nation than the Serbs or Croats. Another is that, whereas in Yugoslavia the pressure for change after 1949 came only from external factors, in Poland it comes from within Polish society, from the workers and the intellectuals themselves. Yet false optimism would be mistaken. The economic crisis can hardly be overcome without massive Western aid, and if economic conditions deteriorate there may well be mass discontent and disorders which would give an excuse for Soviet intervention. Moreover, it is quite possible that even if there are not disorders the Soviet government may decide on aggression, with or without an "invitation"

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from some well-groomed Polish Communist quislings. The economic danger could be averted by Western economic aid, on a Marshall Plan scale, the military danger by strong diplomatic warnings to Moscow in advance by the West. At present there is little sign of either. Yet if a crisis is allowed to develop into a Polish-Soviet war possibly spreading into East Germany and leading to an uprising there, the danger of world war would be very grave.

In Hungary the Kadar "government" seems no stronger than it was. There is no more organized resistance, either armed or by strikes. But production is well below normal, and the whole nation remains implacably if passively hostile. Kadar promises better economic conditions to both workers and peasants. But men whose brothers and children have been massacred, whose country after a week of freedom has been plunged again in slavery, do not joyfully respond to offers of more shirts or better potato prices from the murderers. The workers will not join Kadar's reorganized Communist party. The educated youth, the pride of ten years of Communist rule, led the movement against the regime in October and remain united in hatred of all that Kadar stands for. School children continue to demonstrate against the regime. Its only success has been to reconstitute a police force, and even this Kadar could only do by recruiting members of the AVH, who had subjected him, and many thousands more innocent than him, to unmentionable tortures. Already this police is collecting information about those who took part in the October revolution.

Kadar at first claimed that he was the heir to the revolution, and would punish only those who allegedly perverted it into a "counter-revolution." Now his henchmen are abandoning even this specious distinction. The only noticeable difference between the Kadar and Rakosi regimes is that Rakosi was at least a man who could command respect as well as hatred. Hungary is a potentially rich country, richer than Poland. Its people are as skilled, as intelligent, and as industrious as the Poles. If Moscow would

remove the odious Kadar, restore Nagy and let him work out his economic policies and make Hungary neutral, it would be a good neighbor to the Soviet Union and become a flourishing country, with a just balance between industry and agriculture, an excellent export trade, and splendid contributions to make to science and literature. But this the frightened Soviet butchers will not do, and so the Hungarian people remain inert, the economy stagnates, all the spiritual and material resources of this nation are wasted. Nobody gains, not even Moscow.

THE Yugoslav leaders tried for some weeks to justify the Kadar regime. Their embassy in Budapest persuaded Nagy and other revolutionary leaders to leave its premises, on the grounds of a promise of their safety from Kadar which it is hard to believe that so astute a man as Tito can have taken seriously. When the promise was violated by the Soviet masters of Budapest, they made mild protests. But even moderate criticisms by Tito and Kardelj of Soviet policy provoked fierce attacks in the Soviet press, and condemnation of the very principle of "national Communism." Soviet-Yugoslav relations are now about as bad as they were before Stalin died. If Tito ever hoped that the Soviet leaders would agree to a condominium with himself in Rumania and Bulgaria, he can hardly do so now. Both these countries remain firmly attached to Moscow, and no breath of criticism is allowed. Czechoslovakia and East Germany, under Siroky and Ulbricht, never deviated from Stalinism, even after the Twentieth Congress.

In the West, the Communist parties have suffered serious but not fatal shocks. The massacre of the Budapest workers was too much for some of their intellectuals. One or two British academics are tottering on the edge of a break with the party. In Italy Eugenio Reale has been expelled. But the cadres of the French and Italian parties remain firm. Both parties, after all, are essentially extensions of the Soviet bureaucracy operating on foreign soil. The cadres do not

really live in France or Italy, but in a closed extra-territorial world of their own. Their material and spiritual existence is inseparable from the party. Intellectual aspirations and moral doubts do not assail them. They will keep the machine going, and the machine can still mobilize the masses. The bulk of the French working class, more loyally totalitarian than any in the world, will follow them. In Italy it seems that even before October they had lost some ground among the skilled working class of the North, and that Italian workers felt deeply about Hungary—which the French workers did not. Perhaps the common memories of 1848 had something to do with it. The attitude of Nenni, who is both an intellectual and a workers' leader, was also very important. But among the real "proletariat" of Italy, the submerged half of the nation, the workers of Rome and Naples and Palermo and the landless laborers and small peasants of the South, the Communists have not lost ground. Western Communism, as a weapon of Soviet policy, remains much what it was. It is too weak to make a revolution, but so it has been since 1945. Its nuisance value, as a pressure group on foreign policy, a source of industrial unrest, and a recruiting ground for Soviet spies, has been only slightly diminished.

THE most interesting developments of these months have been in Soviet Russia itself. The three social groups which made the Hungarian revolution, the students, the workers, and the army, have shown signs of unrest in Russia too. There have been large student meetings at Moscow and Leningrad universities at which criticism not only of students' living conditions but of general policy was uttered. Student audiences have refused to accept the official version of events in Hungary. Khrushchev himself found it necessary to threaten them, and the Soviet press has been devoting some attention to "demagogy" in the universities. This crime has also been rife among the workers. The trade union newspaper *Trud* has denounced it. When, at a meeting in

the Kaganovich ball-bearings factory in Moscow, the city's party boss, Mrs. Furtseva, a candidate member of the Presidium, harangued the workers, who had recently gone on strike in protest against an increase in their labor "norms," about the necessity of discipline, there were cries of "How much do *you* earn?"

Whether the unrest among Soviet factory workers is due only to economic causes, or was affected by news of events in Hungary, is not clear. In the army, however, there is no doubt that the Hungarian revolution has had its effects. Every Soviet school child is brought up on romantic Marxist legends about heroic workers fighting on the barricades against soldiers sent to shoot them at the orders of capitalists and tyrants. In Budapest several thousand Soviet soldiers saw all this come true. The workers fought in the streets and the factories, but the Soviet soldiers themselves were cast not as heroes but as agents of the oppressors. Of their true role, and of the true nature of the people they were ordered to crush, they had no doubt. This is clear not only from the cases of desertion (which have been exaggerated in the Western press, but were considerable), but also from the many conversations between Soviet soldiers and Russian-speaking Hungarians after the fighting had stopped. In the 1940's Soviet soldiers returning from the West were subjected to long quarantine, under supervision of the security police, before they were allowed to return to their homes. Since 1953 the police has lost much of its power over the Soviet soldier and the Soviet citizen. To restore this power now would be very difficult. Even if Marshal Zhukov is worried about the morale of his troops, he will hardly agree to strengthening the hand of the police, thus undoing the army's one solid gain since Beria's fall. It is thus most unlikely that the government can now prevent the true story of the Hungarian revolution spreading from returning soldiers to the civilian population of the Soviet Union.

These are of course only beginnings. But they are things that would have been in-

conceivable in Stalin's lifetime. The change is not in conditions in the Soviet Union so much as in men's minds. People now dare to express themselves. It is the difference between the political atmosphere under Alexander III and Nicholas II. In the 1880's people hated the autocracy, but they respected it as immensely powerful and ruthless: in the late 1890's they lost their respect, and began to talk about a coming revolution. It took its time, but come it did. In the mid-20th century the pace of history is quicker. The Hungarian revolution showed that intellectuals, workers, and army can destroy a totalitarian regime, provided that there is no foreign intervention. There would be no foreign intervention in favor of the regime if there were a revolution in the Soviet Union. If Poland develops freely, it may show that a socialist democracy is possible, with workers' self-government, intellectual freedom, and fair treatment of the peasantry. Such a demonstration would have effects no less explosive than those of Budapest. Improvements in the standard of living of the Soviet people will not arrest the process. On the contrary, it is when people emerge from the most crushing poverty that they begin to indulge in political thoughts.

Western observers should not be afraid of the thought of a Russian revolution. The failure of the naive hopes that were held in Britain and France in 1939 that there would be a revolution in Germany if Hitler went to war, made many Westerners believe that there could never be revolution against a totalitarian regime. But the Hungarians have shown that there can. Hitler's regime in 1939 had all the advantages of novelty and success. Many, perhaps most, Germans believed that Hitler's internal policies had been good for Germany, and there could be no doubt that his foreign policy had been extremely successful. Moreover, in time of war normal patriotism always operates at first in favor of one's government.

There was no reason why there should have been a revolution in Germany in 1939. But the Soviet regime today has none of the charms of novelty. It is very old and very

stale. Its leaders have given their subjects just enough freedom in the last three years to create a strong appetite for more, and now they appear to be going back even on these concessions. There is no war, and it is most unlikely that the propaganda myth of hostile encirclement really convinces many people. I am not suggesting that a Russian revolution is imminent. I do not believe it is. But the strains and pressures on the Soviet regime have been increased by the events of October, and the widespread combination of apathy and discontent among the Soviet people is a dangerous foundation for the regime. For some time there have been pressures for reform in Soviet society, especially from the upper social stratum, the "toiling intelligentsia" as it is called by Soviet spokesmen, or the "state bourgeoisie," as I prefer to describe it. To the pressure for reform can now be added the beginnings of pressure for revolution. The two will develop side by side. The development of revolutionary pressure depends chiefly on the extent of contact between the intellectual youth and the elite of the working class in the great industrial centers, and on the extent to which the true facts about Hungary and Poland become known to the Soviet public.

WESTERN policy towards the Soviet Union in Europe has long been almost completely inert. This is true not only of the West European countries, Britain included, but also of the United States, for all the eloquent phrases of the President and Mr. Dulles since 1952. At present, as a result of the similar past passivity of American policy in the Middle East and of the Anglo-French fiasco at Port Said, all attention is being concentrated on the Arab world. These problems indeed require urgent and thoughtful attention, but the West will neglect Europe and Russia at its peril. The Middle East's oil is needed for Europe's economic prosperity, but the security of Europe is a matter of life and death to all Western nations.

Perhaps the most urgent single question

for the West is to decide what economic and other measures can be taken to prevent a situation arising in Poland which might bring a Soviet intervention there, with the danger of world war. Apart from this are two much wider questions. The first is, is there any general settlement of European security that the West could offer the Soviet Union with any hope of success? The second is, can the West do anything to help or accelerate the pressures for reform or revolution within the Soviet Union?

A European settlement must involve the reunification of Germany, Soviet evacuation of Eastern Europe, and at least some withdrawal of Western troops from Germany. There is a good deal of talk at present about these things, but most of it is so confused as to obscure the real problems. On the one hand, some British and continental socialists talk as if it were certain that the Soviet government would agree to a settlement if only the West would agree to a neutralization of Germany. On the other hand, some American and British commentators angrily brush away any talk of a settlement on the ground that NATO cannot be abandoned. But the question is rather more complicated.

IT MAY be as well to begin by mentioning some kinds of settlement having no chance whatever of acceptance. One of these is that Germany should be unified under the regime of Ulbricht: in other words, that the Soviet empire be extended to the Rhine. This is certainly the aim of the Soviet leaders, but there is not the slightest chance that it would be accepted by the West, however camouflaged. Another is that all "foreign" troops be withdrawn from Germany and Eastern Europe, and all alliances be dissolved, to be replaced by a single European security pact. For the Soviet Union, this would be a good second best to the Sovietization of all Germany. It would mean that all American forces would return across the Atlantic, and that NATO would cease to exist, while the Soviet Union would have armies on the Polish, Slovak, Hungarian, and Rumanian borders which would re-enter those coun-

tries whenever the Soviet government chose. A single pact of which both the Western countries and the Soviet Union were members would be doomed to complete frustration and could protect nobody. This settlement is therefore unacceptable to the West. A third settlement would be that Germany should be reunited under the Bonn government and join NATO, and that all Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Eastern Europe unconditionally. This of course would be admirable from the Western point of view, but there is not the slightest chance that the Soviet Union would agree.

With these three hypotheses ruled out, one may consider briefly the five points of substance on which an agreement would have to be negotiated. These are the reunification of Germany, the German-Polish frontier, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, the relationship of a united Germany to other states, and European security.

Reunification of Germany can only mean the establishment of a single government for all Germany freely chosen by the German people. A free election would immediately lead to the disappearance of the Communist regime now existing in Eastern Germany, which is detested by the overwhelming majority of its subjects. Thus reunification of Germany can only mean the abolition of the "German Democratic Republic" (DDR), and the reduction to the dimensions of an insignificant sect of the "Socialist Unity party" (SED). Nothing else can be called reunification. For example, some loose association, or confederation, of the two existing German states would not be reunification: the power structure of the SED regime in the eastern third of the country would remain intact. Again, the formation of an "All-German" government on a basis of equal representation of the two existing German governments could not be a step towards reunification. This would merely be a repetition of the Kosice government of Czechoslovakia, formed early in 1945 with the consent of President Benes, which enabled the Czech and Slovak Com-

munists to infiltrate key positions. Fortunately, there is no chance of such maneuvers being repeated now.

The Western nations, including the Germans, now know about Communist tricks. No amount of camouflage can conceal a "Kosice plan." No amount of verbiage can conceal the difference between a free election and a bogus election. The only admissible free election for Germany is one which allows exactly the same opportunities and freedom in all parts of the country to all parties and candidates—the same freedom to Social Democrats and Christian Democrats and Liberals in Leipzig as to Communists in Düsseldorf—and which leads to the formation of a government that will have the same authority in Cologne and Berlin and Dresden. This is something that cannot be concealed. International observers and international press correspondents, reporting without censorship, can make it quite clear. Either these conditions exist, or they do not. Either the Soviet government will consent to them, or it will not. If it does, it knows that its puppet regime will be swept ingloriously away. All past and present indications are that it will not consent. But until it does, there can be no reunification of Germany, and until Germany is reunified there can be no European security.

IF IT be nevertheless assumed that these conditions are fulfilled, and that a reunited independent Germany exists, she will then have to reach an agreement on her eastern frontier with Poland. This is primarily a matter for direct negotiations between free Germans and free Poles. The present frontier is not sacrosanct, and there might be some territorial changes, for example between the two Neisse rivers. But I have no doubt that substantially Poland will keep the lands she has gained. They are essential to her industrial development. They are being rapidly filled by the operation of the highest rate of natural population increase in Europe. Their loss is the price Germany must pay for the crimes of Hitler against Poland and against the world.

Germany suffered in the war, as did all belligerent countries. Since the war she has made a remarkable economic recovery, thanks to help from the United States and Britain as well as to the efforts of her own people. If the other European powers are now to make further sacrifices of their own interests to help the Germans to obtain unity, it is reasonable to expect the Germans too to make sacrifices. If Germany accepts substantially the loss of her eastern provinces to Poland, no other European state will object—certainly not the Soviet Union or France or Britain. Undoubtedly, there are strong minority pressure groups in Western Germany that are implacably—and, from a German point of view, quite understandably—opposed to such a sacrifice. But German governments, like other governments, must have the courage to stand up to minority pressure groups, rather than use them as an excuse for inaction in matters where the interests of their allies are involved. It should also not be forgotten that at present both Western Germany and Poland have one great common interest, the removal of the puppet East German state, which is an armed enemy base that threatens the existence of both countries. To the united Germany and the free Poland of the future, cooperation with each other is a greater interest than any mere territorial problem. It would, of course, be very foolish to be naively optimistic about Polish-German friendship. But if it is true that there can be no German unity without the abolition of the East German puppet, it is no less true that there can be no European settlement without Polish-German agreement.

The third condition for a European settlement is the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. This would undoubtedly be followed, at varying intervals, by changes in the regimes and policies of the East European countries, at first certainly towards national independence, and then probably towards political democracy. Independence would involve the right of each government to choose whether it wishes to remain allied to the Soviet Union or not.

What could the West offer the Soviet Union in return for this? Certainly *not* the abolition of NATO. As far as the countries of the Atlantic seaboard are concerned, the most that could be said would be that, as the East European states must be free to choose whether they will remain allied to the Soviet Union, so the Atlantic countries must be free to choose whether they will remain allied to each other and to the United States. But in fact these countries have already freely made this choice, and are of course free at some future date to change their minds if conditions radically change. But the West could offer the Soviet Union the assurance that it would not ask a united Germany to adhere to NATO. Another possibility would be that both a united Germany and the East European states should be specifically declared neutral, and should be entitled to their own armed forces, on a parity with other European states—in fact, that they should have a status similar to that of Sweden. The type of armaments that they should have might also be a subject for negotiation. This could, however, be decided only with the free consent of the German and East European governments. To impose on them some unilateral discriminatory disarmament would not be politically practicable.

THIS settlement—reunited Germany, Polish-German agreement, Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, uncommitted status for Germany and for Eastern Europe—would have to be guaranteed by all the powers concerned. There would have to be a general European security pact which would commit all signatories to go to war with any state that violated the settlement. Re-entry of Soviet or Western troops into any state of the “uncommitted zone,” whether at the “invitation” of some puppet regime or not, would constitute aggression. A European security pact of this sort would differ radically from the European security pact offered some time ago by Molotov. It would follow German reunification and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe, and

would not involve the abolition of NATO (except for the secession of Germany from NATO). The security pact would of course be signed by both the United States and the Soviet Union. This, of course, I fully realize, involves complicated questions concerning types of defense and types of deterrent on which I am in no way competent to express an opinion.

From a Western point of view, such a settlement is hindered by one great obstacle: German unwillingness to accept the Oder-Neisse line. If this were overcome, the settlement would still involve grave risks. One is that Germany might later join with the Soviet Union against the West, perhaps cementing the union by a sixth partition of Poland. This is a subject on which pages could be written. All that I can say is that after a great deal of thought I believe on balance that this risk is worth taking. A second is political subversion. The West would be prevented from aiding any government in the “uncommitted zone” threatened from within by a Communist or Stalinist rising. This need not, I suggest, unduly alarm the West. It is far more likely that there would be a rising against Communism in the evacuated East European countries—against which the security pact would preclude the Soviet Union from taking action—than a rising in favor of Communism or Stalinism in Germany or Austria or Yugoslavia—against which the West would be similarly precluded from action. A third danger, far the most grave, is that the security pact would be ineffective because the West European and American peoples, concerned only with the preservation of their own comfort, would prevent their governments from fulfilling their obligations, and that the Soviet leaders, knowing the weaknesses of the West, would risk aggression. This will of course depend partly on whether military experts can devise effective deterrents that fall short of the supreme horror of the hydrogen bomb. But it must be admitted frankly that against the danger of weak Western public opinion there is no sure guarantee. No government and no na-

tion is stronger than its own courage and sense of honor allow it to be. No written pacts can solve this problem.

It seems to me that a settlement within the broad framework sketched above would, despite the very real risks and sacrifices, be in the interest of the Western nations. Indeed, I cannot see that any terms short of these can secure a European settlement, can give the people of Europe the peace they have not known since 1914, or free the people of America from at least a large part of their nightmare. (There would of course still remain a host of Asian and African nightmares.)

But is there any chance that the Soviet government would accept these terms? If it were primarily concerned with the security of Soviet territory, I do not see why it should not, for this is precisely what it would get. It would also be relieved of the burden of terrorizing 100,000,000 people in Eastern Europe who hate its rule. Unfortunately this is not the main concern of the Soviet leaders. Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin, and the rest of them are dogmatic obscurantists whose fixed immutable aim is to spread their form of government to the ends of the earth, and meanwhile not to allow it to disappear from any place in which it has once been set up. For this reason they will not allow the abolition of the East German regime, the first and inescapable condition for a settlement. There was a real chance that they might have entered into negotiations in October, and meanwhile allowed Hungary to maintain a precarious freedom, if the Suez crisis had not come when it did. Now there seems to be no chance.

Nevertheless, it is important that the West should work out and declare a program of action. One reason is that the West must give hope to the Germans and to the East Europeans. There is a temptation now to turn one's back on the Soviet bloc, to draw tighter the links between the West European nations, and to leave the rest to their fate. But this will not work. Western Germany is a loyal partner today in NATO,

but it cannot be expected that the German people should write off 18,000,000 Germans. This will always be a fatal weakness of any exclusively West European bloc. No less important is the demoralizing effect that such a policy would have on 100,000,000 East Europeans, who today are among the most devoted friends of the West in the world—certainly much truer friends than the Indians and Arabs can ever be.

BUT there is another reason. For ten years we have become accustomed to the Soviet technique of appealing, over the heads of Western governments, to the people of the West and of the more or less dependent countries of Asia or Africa. Today at last it is possible to appeal, over the heads of the Soviet government, to the Russian and Ukrainian peoples. Two things in particular we must tell these peoples. One is that it is possible to overthrow a totalitarian regime: the full story of the Hungarian revolution must be told, with special emphasis on the points of similarity and difference with the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, which every Soviet child is taught at school. The second point is that the Western peoples have no hatred for the peoples of the Soviet Union, that they wish only to live in peace with them. In order to make this clear, it is necessary to explain to them in terms that they can understand what the aims of Western policy are, and what are the rights of other peoples—not only of Poles and Hungarians and Germans, but also of Ukrainians and Estonians and Georgians. Now at last we know that we have an audience in the Soviet Union—not the hard-faced men in their fifties and sixties who rose to power by the *Yezhovshchina* (Great Purge) twenty years ago, but the young generation which is excluded from influence and power, which does not feel itself responsible for the past, which is tired of stale rhetoric, and aspires to something very simple the mention of which induces in many sophisticated Western intellectuals an embarrassed snigger, but which is taken seriously in 20th-century

Russia, as it was in 17th-century England—freedom.

No doubt Western broadcasting services in Russian are doing good work. No doubt also, Soviet jamming creates great difficulty. But far more can and should be done, far more money spent, far more thought given, far more be jointly planned among the American, European, and British authorities concerned. This is no sideshow, no intellectual luxury, but a vital weapon in the political war in which, whether we know it or not, we have been engaged ever since the war against Hitler ended.

Western broadcasts, and any other con-

tacts between Western and Soviet people, including individual and collective visits in both directions, can have only a marginal effect on developments inside the Soviet Union. The pressures for reform and for revolution can be but slightly accelerated or retarded by wise or foolish Western talk or action. But the West can and must explain itself to the young generation in the Soviet Union. If we do not do this, we shall find that when at last the great changes do come, and new people and forces rise to the top, they will be no more able to understand and to make peace with us than Khrushchev and Zhukov.

THE LOST CHILDREN

JACOB SLOAN

THEY have become no legend. Fifteen
winters after, no one any more
dreams of their pigeoning home-
ward in the same light cottons
they were driven out in, wings,
pushing hands, through the dumptruck bars.

But the Lost Tribes are no comparison.
What stones could time have possibly
thrown across the river Sambation
of our wide unrest, to defend
them from the alien host?
What Messiah raised up
to head their gay infant crusade
for our redemption?

Part of no fate, nothing at all to do
with our vacated faith, they have slid
down the drains of our memory
unclogged by myth. And this our
judgment, ever weighing relatives,
gravely nods yes: Screen
the polluting bodies of their screams
out. Nothing echoes in the sewer now.

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